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Unconscious bias in employment decisions is actionable under current law.
BY MARTIN KATZ
any commentators have criticized current anti-discrimination law on the grounds that it does not
adequately prohibit unconscious bias in employment decisions. That claim is wrong: Unconscious bias is fully
actionable, and it can generally be proved by knowledgeable
employment lawyers.
The idea behind unconscious bias is that well-meaning
employers and supervisors, who would likely consider themselves supporters or even champions of equality, might subconsciously harbor attitudes that result in negative employment
decisions for women and minorities.
For example, an employer might consciously see himself as
strongly egalitarian, believing that men and women are equally
qualified and equally dedicated. He might even pass a lie detector test on this question. But subconsciously, he might see
women as more dedicated to their families than to their jobs. In
making a hiring or promotion decision, he might act based upon
this unconscious bias—thus reducing employment opportunity
for women.
Most psychologists agree that unconscious bias is likely the
most prevalent form of discrimination in today’s workplace. So
the question is whether modern anti-discrimination law is up to
the task of dealing with this type of bias.
Many commentators have charged that current law falls short
in this respect, that it is incapable of addressing unconscious
bias either because the law does not prohibit unconscious bias or
because unconscious bias is too difficult to prove. These critics
are, for the most part, wrong. Unconscious discrimination is
actionable, and though establishing its existence poses certain
challenges, these problems of proof are often overstated.

“disparate treatment” discrimination (by far the most common
type of claim brought by employees) requires “intent,” thereby
precluding claims of unconscious discrimination. This charge is
simply wrong. Disparate-treatment statutes require causation,
not intent.
Disparate treatment statutes all require that the challenged
employment decision (for example, firing or failure to hire)
must have occurred “because of” a protected characteristic of
the plaintiff, such as race or sex. The words “because of” clearly require causation. That is, the employer must have used the
protected characteristic as a factor in its decision-making. One
can debate exactly how the employer must have used the protected characteristic in its decision. Can it be a “motivating”
factor? Or does it need to be a “but for” factor? But all of these
are causal concepts.
The question is whether, in addition to causation, disparate
treatment statutes also require intent. And, if they do, what type
of intent? For example, do these statutes require intent to bring
about a particular result, such as harm to the plaintiff’s group
(for example, blacks or women)? Do they require intent to violate the law? Or do they require intent to utilize the protected
characteristic (such as race or sex) in one’s decision-making?
Any one of these three types of intent requirement would likely
preclude claims of unconscious bias.
There is no indication in the statutes, or in their legislative
history, that they require any of these types of intent. If anything,
the statutes have been understood as broad prohibitions on discrimination, which would seem to proscribe unconscious, as
well as conscious, discrimination. As the Supreme Court
explained in McDonnell Douglas v. Green (1973), Title VII of
the 1964 Civil Rights Act “tolerates no . . . discrimination, subtle
or otherwise.”

CAUSATION, NOT INTENT

COGNITIVE BIAS

The first charge leveled against current doctrine is that it does
not prohibit unconscious bias. More precisely, the charge is that

The few cases to squarely address the issue have held that
unconscious discrimination is actionable. The best—and most
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frequently cited—discussion of this issue is probably Thomas
v. Eastman Kodak (1999). There, the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the 1st Circuit explained: “The ultimate question is whether the
employee has been treated disparately ‘because of [a protected
characteristic].’ This is so regardless of whether the employer
consciously intended to base the evaluations on [that characteristic], or simply did so because of unthinking stereotypes or
bias.” Thomas also explained that, “The Supreme Court has
long recognized that unlawful discrimination can stem from
stereotypes and other types of cognitive biases, as well as from
conscious animus.”
Many commentators act as if Thomas is an exception to the
general rule that disparate treatment law requires conscious discrimination. Yet this is simply not the case. In fact, it is difficult—if not impossible—to find a case that expressly holds that
a disparate treatment claim requires conscious discrimination.
So why do so many people believe that disparate treatment
law requires conscious discrimination? The answer probably has
to do with the unfortunate terminology the Supreme Court has
used to distinguish disparate treatment doctrine from disparate
impact doctrine: The Court explained that disparate treatment
discrimination requires “intent,” whereas disparate impact discrimination does not. And the word “intent” conjures up notions
of consciousness.
Yet all the Court seems to mean by “intent” in this context is
that disparate-treatment doctrine requires an inquiry into the
employer’s decision-making process, while disparate impact
doctrine does not. This required inquiry appears to be nothing
more than a search for causation—for facts demonstrating that
the employer utilized a protected characteristic such as race or
sex in its decision-making.
Although the Court has repeatedly characterized disparate
treatment as “intentional” discrimination, it has never indicated
that disparate treatment doctrine requires “intent” in the sense of
intending to cause harm to a group, intending to violate the law,
or intending to use a protected characteristic in one’s decisionmaking. Thus, there seems to be no requirement of “intent” in
the sense of requiring conscious bias.

PROVING UNCONSCIOUS BIAS
The second, and more persuasive, charge leveled against
current doctrine is that proving unconscious bias can be difficult. Of course, lots of things that are illegal are difficult to
prove. The question is whether proving unconscious discrimination is so difficult that the law cannot effectively combat
this problem.
In this regard, it is important to recognize that the difficulties
of proving unconscious bias are, to some extent, overstated.
Critics’ primary culprit is the “pretext” method of proving discrimination set out in McDonnell Douglas. This method allows
plaintiffs to prove discrimination by allowing them to attack the
reason proffered by the defendant for the challenged action.
Suppose, for example, that the defendant claimed it fired the
plaintiff because the plaintiff was habitually tardy. Under
McDonnell Douglas, the plaintiff can prove discrimination by
challenging the defendant’s proffered reason—here, the claim
that she was habitually tardy.

There are other methods of proof available that might be
used to show discrimination, whether conscious or unconscious. But some of these methods, such as admissions of
guilt or statements indicating bias, are not available in most
cases. Others, such as statistical proof, are expensive to collect and present (in addition to being unavailable for small
employers that cannot provide enough data for an adequate
sample size). Thus, McDonnell Douglas tends to be the most
common way in which plaintiffs prove disparate treatment.
Accordingly, this method has been the focus of the dispute
over unconscious discrimination.
The critics of current doctrine have suggested that
McDonnell Douglas is incapable of addressing unconscious
bias for two reasons.
First, the critics claim that McDonnell Douglas requires dishonesty, which precludes the test from ferreting out unconscious
discrimination. They believe that a defendant would lie only
when he is consciously discriminating.
It is true that McDonnell Douglas requires dishonesty.
Challenging the defendant’s proffered reason permits an inference of discrimination because, if the reason is wrong, a factfinder may conclude (1) that the defendant lied, (2) that the lie
served to cover up wrongdoing, and (3) what was being covered
up was discrimination.
But dishonesty is not limited to those who consciously discriminate. In fact, the whole premise of unconscious discrimination suggests otherwise. The idea of unconscious discrimination is that an employer can lie to himself. He can believe
that he subscribes to egalitarian notions and yet act based
upon unconscious stereotypes.
Thus, there is no reason why the lie required for McDonnell
Douglas precludes the detection of unconscious discrimination. There is no reason why a fact-finder who doubts the reason proffered by the defendant cannot conclude that he is
lying (to himself or to the court) to cover up conscious or
unconscious discrimination.
A second, related claim by critics of McDonnell Douglas is
that it presents an either/or paradigm, which precludes claims
of unconscious bias. Critics charge that McDonnell Douglas
requires a fact-finder to conclude either (1) that the defendant
acted for legitimate reasons, or (2) that he discriminated. Such
a framework would seem to provide no room for a finding that
the defendant acted based on both legitimate and illegitimate
considerations—a situation that often occurs in cases of
unconscious bias.
At one level, this charge is erroneous. McDonnell Douglas
requires a fact-finder to conclude only that a particular proffered
reason is true or false. It does not require the fact-finder to conclude that a particular proffered reason is the only reason for the
challenged action. For example, a fact-finder could conclude
that one of the employer’s proffered reasons (excessive tardiness) was true, but that another (poor performance on a project)
was false—and a coverup for discrimination. In other words,
McDonnell Douglas is perfectly capable of addressing so-called
“mixed motive” cases.
But at another level, the either/or charge is valid.
McDonnell Douglas is not capable of addressing cases where
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the proffered reason is factually correct, but where that reason
is nevertheless infected by bias—whether conscious or unconscious. For example, suppose that the employer is correct that
the plaintiff was habitually tardy. But suppose that the
employer was particularly prone to notice tardiness in female
employees because of a tendency to view females as dedicated more to family than to work.
In such a case, the decision would be discriminatory. Women
would be subjected to a higher standard for tardiness than men.
But such discrimination would not be amenable to detection by
McDonnell Douglas. That method of proof works only if the
employer’s proffered reason is false—not if it is true but tainted
by discrimination.
This observation, however, is not a valid indictment of
McDonnell Douglas. It means only that, in some cases, the
McDonnell Douglas pretext method of proving discrimination
will not work. In such cases, plaintiffs will need to find some

other way to prove discrimination—or they will lose. But the
fact that McDonnell Douglas will not work in all cases hardly
means that it is an impediment to proving discrimination—conscious or unconscious.
If McDonnell Douglas is insufficient to detect discrimination
in a large portion of unconscious bias cases, and if other existing
means of proving discrimination are also ineffectual in such
cases, perhaps disparate treatment law needs to be adjusted. But
before we look to change current doctrine, we should appreciate—and make sure that courts appreciate—the ways in which
existing law can address unconscious bias.
Martin Katz is an associate professor at the Sturm College of
Law of the University of Denver. He may be contacted at
mkatz@law.du.edu. His article “Reclaiming McDonnell Douglas,” which will appear in the November 2007 issue of the Notre
Dame Law Review, will discuss these issues further.
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